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Abstract
A rapidly growing globalized and digitalized gambling industry has compelled European
jurisdictions to take action in order to secure some level of gambling market control,
to secure public funds from gambling, and to protect citizens from gambling-related
harm. This study concerns the market protectionist endeavour to merge three gambling
operators into one state-owned monopoly in Finland in 2017. The justification of
the systemic change is analysed in key policy documents and media reporting that
discerns the political narratives that nudged the monopoly merger from the idea stage
to its completion. Within the narratives, the merger is presented as necessary due
to the threats of market intrusion by foreign gambling operators and the likelihood
of an internal system implosion framed by European Union (EU) law. The worries
expressed in the studied materials plug into a general zeitgeist of globalization. The
justifications of the systemic change presuppose the inevitable determination of the
change and an innate and constant human desire to gamble. Critical views on
the merger were introduced in the media at a late stage, stressing the role of the
media as a facilitator and manufacturer of political consent. The study demonstrates
how market protectionist justifications can, through the maintenance of a regulated
gambling market, assure preservation of national public funds obtained from gambling
in the EU. The official gambling policy objective of securing public health played a
secondary role in the process.
Keywords: gambling policy, justifications, policy problems, media analysis, Finland
Résumé
La croissance fulgurante de l’industrie du jeu, mondialisée et numérisée, a incité les
autorités européennes à prendre des mesures afin d’assurer un certain contrôle sur ce
marché, de garantir les fonds publics provenant du jeu et de protéger les citoyens des
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dommages liés au jeu. Cette étude porte sur la tentative protectionniste de la Finlande
de fusionner trois exploitants de jeux d’argent en un monopole d’État en 2017. On
analyse les raisons justifiant le changement systémique dans des documents politiques
clés et des reportages dans les médias en mettant en évidence le contenu narratif
politique qui a conduit à la fusion du monopole, depuis la naissance de l’idée jusqu’à
sa concrétisation. Dans ce contenu narratif, la fusion est présentée comme une nécessité
en raison des menaces d’intrusion par des exploitants de jeux étrangers et la probabilité
d’une implosion du système interne encadré par le droit de l’UE. Les inquiétudes
exprimées dans les documents analysés cadrent avec une tendance généralisée à
l’égard de la mondialisation. Les fondements qui sous-tendent ce changement systémique
présupposent l’inévitabilité du changement et un désir inné et constant de jouer chez
l’être humain. Les points de vue critiques sur la fusion sont présentés tardivement
dans les médias, ce qui confirme le rôle des médias comme facilitateur et créateur
de consentement politique. L’étude montre que les justifications protectionnistes du
marché peuvent, par le maintien d’une réglementation du marché des jeux, garantir
l’apport de fonds publics nationaux générés par les jeux de hasard dans l’UE.
L’objectif officiel de la politique en matière de jeu visant à protéger la santé publique
a joué un rôle de second plan dans le processus.
Introduction
In countries all over the world, a rapidly growing globalized and digitalized gambling
market is calling for adjustments in gambling policies and legislation. A common
concern pertains to the preservation of state incomes from gambling revenues
threatened by the growth of an unregulated online market (Laffey, Della Sala, &
Laffey, 2016; Myllymaa, 2017). In Finland, whose residents spend the second highest
amount on gambling in the European Union (EU), this represents a significant part
of the state budget: 1.2 billion euros in 2014, 2.2% of total government revenue
(Roukka, 2016; ‘‘The World’s Biggest Gamblers,’’ 2017). Although the lack of
reliable European-level statistics on gambling makes it difficult to compare other
governments’ dependence on gambling revenues, in Sweden, a country with a similar
monopoly system (which will be replaced with a licensing system in 2019), gambling
revenue constituted 0.7% of total government revenue in 2015 (Carlgren, 2018;
Lotteriinspektionen, 2017). In Finland, the proceeds from the lottery tax (218 million
euros in 2014) are added to the general budget of the state. The remainder of the total
gambling revenue (ca. 1.0 billion euros) is diverted into grants for activities in arts,
science, sports, and promotion of health and wellbeing For most of the beneficiaries,
gambling revenue is the most important source of income. Until 2017, a system with
three state-controlled monopoly operators with three separate product palettes—
lottery, slots, and horse betting—assured in principle that gambling operators did
not compete internally while circulating gambling incomes for the public good. In
2017, the three operators were merged into one state-owned gambling monopoly that
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operates all legal forms of land-based and online gambling (lotteries, slot machines,
casino games, horse and sports betting).
This study concerns the political justification of introducing a more centralized
monopoly system in Finland. This was an exceptional solution in view of how other
EU member states have responded to recent gambling market transformations. The
only other European country that has chosen to focus on safeguarding its monopoly
system is fellow Nordic country Norway, a member of the European Free Trade
Association, a partner of the EU (cf. Borch, 2015). Most EU countries have chosen
to open up their online gambling markets to operators in other member states
(lottery being the only game that is often kept within a monopoly structure) to the
extent that public gambling revenues are still secured through taxation and licence
fees (Laffey et al., 2016). The EU thus seems to be open to considerable discretion
among member states to internally accommodate the contradictory aims of public
health and fiscal policy in gambling market regulation (Doukas & Anderson, 2008;
Van den Bogaert & Cuyvers, 2011).
In light of EU law, market restrictions such as a monopoly cannot be justified by
the fiscal importance of gambling revenues to a member state (Laffey et al., 2016).
A passable public health justification for the sustenance of gambling monopolies
in the EU is the prevention of gambling-related harm (e.g., Laffey et al., 2016;
Myllymaa, 2017, pp. 233–234; Tammi, 2008). This justification was also pleaded in
2017 when the three Finnish state-controlled gambling monopoly operators—Veikkaus,
RAY, and Fintoto—were merged into one state-owned monopoly with a gross gaming
revenue of 1.8 billion euros and exclusive rights to all gambling (with the exception
of one operator, PAF, established in the autonomous jurisdiction of the Åland
Islands).
The Finnish case is worth highlighting in a discussion that principally centres on
how states regulate harmful products with the contradictory aims of public profit
maximization and public health. Gambling policies are often criticized for their
incoherence, particularly in the EU. Laffey et al. (2016, p. 13) argue that member
states in the EU have given priority to national economic interests and only ‘‘when
it suited their case, used arguments about public health.’’ Similarly, Myllymaa (2017)
calls the discourse on gambling in the EU an ‘‘organized hypocrisy’’ (p. 233): Member
states have learned to use the public health arguments in order to justify the national
protection of state incomes from gambling.
In order to unfold how the unique monopoly merger was discursively enabled and
scaffolded in political and popular discourse, we used Carol Bacchi’s ‘‘What’s the
problem represented to be?’’ (WPR) approach in this study, which inquires into the
policy problem representations, deliberation, and discourse in policy documents and
in mass media materials. We discerned the storylines of WPR stories that pushed
the problem solution towards the fusion of gambling operators into one state-owned
monopoly company.
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Methods
The policy material consisted of publicly available key policy documents (N = 4) and
media coverage (N = 82) of the gambling monopoly merger. The inclusion criteria
for the key policy documents were that they would discuss the official justifications
and aims of the policy change during the different stages of the legislative process.
Of all such documentation available, only two policy documents were excluded:
the statements by the two committees of parliament, which were assessed as not
introducing any novel justifications of interest for the scope of this study. One of the
weightiest policy documents in the merger process was a report that introduces three
alternative monopoly system models prepared for the government for selecting the
most suitable solution (Ministry of the Interior, 2015). The preparation of the report
was initiated in January 2015, shortly after the government in December 2014
had decided that a merger of the existing monopoly operators was needed that
involved either all three or only two of them. The report was written by officials,
but the representatives of the beneficiaries of gambling revenues (i.e., civil society
organizations) were also involved when the sections on revenue distribution were
considered. Another key policy document in the process was the government’s
monopoly merger proposal to parliament (Finnish Government, 2016). This document
contains justifications for the necessity of merging all three operators into one state-
owned monopoly. The proposal was written by officials but statements by key
stakeholders were integrated. In the Finnish Parliament, a committee is typically
given responsibility for the preparation of government proposals that will be voted
on in a plenary session of parliament. The tasks of the committee involve inviting
statements from other committees. The statement provided by the Social Affairs
and Health Committee of the Parliament (2016) and a report by the Administration
Committee of the Parliament (2016) were both included in the data, as they contained
amendment requests to the original government proposal. Both committees heard
experts and stakeholders in the preparation stage of the statements.
The media material consisted of a corpus of 82 Finnish media items. A total of
54 text items were collected through the web-based archive service of the largest
national daily newspaper, Helsingin Sanomat (HS). HS is a politically unbiased
mainstream publication that serves the study aim of examining public discourse
regarding a political matter. HS, which is the largest daily in the Nordic countries,
has, over the years, prevailed as a powerful and influential institution in Finnish
society (Rahkonen, 2007, p. 86). Additional media materials concerning the gambling
monopoly merger were collected through Google News and Google with search term
combinations such as ‘‘Veikkaus RAY Fintoto merger,’’ ‘‘new monopoly Veikkaus,’’
and ‘‘the gambling fusion’’ (search terms in Finnish: Veikkaus RAY Fintoto
yhdistyminen, uusi monopoli Veikkaus, rahapelifuusio, respectively). Through this
strategy, 28 additional media items, mainly from different Finnish regional
newspapers (printed and online) and Yle News, were collected.
Quality control of the media items was assured by assessing each item in terms of
source (media publication): 10 items by Yle (Finland’s public broadcasting company),
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11 by regional newspapers (such as Karjalainen and Keskipohjanmaa), four by
Talouselämä (one of the biggest business newspapers in Nordic countries), two by
Iltalehti (Finnish evening paper, tabloid), and one by MTV (commercially owned
online and television media company). These are all well-known, established
journalistic products in the Finnish media landscape. They are listed in media
directories (such as earthnewspapers.com) and their dissemination and circulation
are registered, for example, by Media Audit Finland. The entire set of media material
(N = 82) contained a variety of media text genres, including news pieces, analyses, and
short notices. The material was published between September 2014 and June 2017,
and it spanned the period from when the question of a merger first started to appear
until the monopoly was established and put into practice.
To discern the functions of different types of reasoning in the deliberation of the
systemic change (cf. Fischer, 2012), we used Carol Bacchi’s (2009, 2016) WPR
question as an analytical vehicle. Bacchi’s approach is based on genealogical and
post-structural ontology in which policies are not regarded as solutions or responses
to pre-existing problems per se, but the articulation of problems constitutes policy
questions. This distinguishes WPR from mainstream public policy analysis in which
policies are understood as a matter of processing problems that societies or political
systems are facing (see Hoppe, 2013). For example, in their authoritative Handbook
of Public Policy Analysis, Fischer, Miller, and Sidney (2007) see public policy
analysis as historically entangled with a problem-solving function: ‘‘Policy analysis
emerged to both better understand the policymaking process and to supply policy
decision makers with reliable policy-relevant knowledge about pressing economic
and social problems’’ (p. xix). In public policy analysis, policy problems are thus
often presupposed to exist uncritically and self-evidently outside policy process and
outside politics. The analytical value of WPR lies precisely in its focus on the political
aspects related to the constitution of policy problems.
In contrast to mainstream public policy analysis, WPR premises that government
in contemporary societies takes shape through problematizations, that is, through
different ways of constituting problems in policies (Bacchi, 2015). In other words,
instead of accepting the self-evident nature of policy problems, WPR focuses on
critically questioning whether particular policy problems can be analysed as being
constituted and how they might be connected to the practices of government. This
focus is narrated through public stories that imply certain solutions. The WPR
approach is a good companion to political sociology views on societal structure as
being articulated and reproduced in political construction rituals (see Heiskala,
2000). These problem representations play a unique role in the constitution of social
problems because they are supported by the legislative apparatus and the production
of government knowledge, and they become institutionalized over time. Unlike many
competing problem constructions, the problem representations that policies enact
can be enduring: ‘‘They exist in the real’’ (Bacchi, 2016, p. 33, emphasis in the original).
In the case of the Finnish gambling monopoly merger, the newly enacted system
was discursively construed in problem representation stories (WPR stories) during the
deliberation and preparation phase.
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In practice, the WPR approach consists of seven analytical steps with related
questions (for details, see Bacchi, 2009, 2015, 2016). The questions do not constitute
a rigid methodology but more of a perspective that is applied to policy cases, and
researchers who use the approach need not take into account all of the questions
(Bacchi, 2015, p. 133). For this article, we focus mainly on the two first analytical
steps to discern the stories that push the question towards a resolution: Question 1:
What is the problem represented to be in a specific policy? Question 2: What implicit
presuppositions or assumptions underlie this representation of the problem?
As ‘‘public policies constitute policy ‘problems’’’ (Bacchi, 2009, p. 2, emphasis in the
original), the purpose of Question 1 is to reveal what is thought to be problematic
within a concrete policy proposal, in this case the Finnish monopoly merger. Bacchi
(2015) considers Question 1 as commonsensical: ‘‘What we propose to do about
something indicates what we think needs change and, hence what we think is
problematic’’ (p. 132). Policies usually consist of many proposals and it is possible
that there are multiple problem representations within a policy, even contradictory
problem representations. The purpose of Question 2 is to analyse the presuppositions
underlying the policy problem representations. The task here is to identify the
conceptual logic implied by the problem representation, that is, the often deep-seated
cultural and political meanings that make the problem representation coherent and
intelligible (Bacchi, 2009). Moreover, governing presupposes that the governed
individuals or populations possess certain kinds of qualities, self-identities, or capacities
for action (Burchell, 1991). In short, the practices of government presuppose the
existence of certain kinds of subjects.
We used the qualitative analysis software tool ATLAS.ti when structuring and
analysing the material (hereafter referred to as coding). Coding of the policy
documents focused on identifying the problem representations and corresponding
argumentation and logic (Bacchi’s Questions 1 and 2). The aim of coding the media
material was to group aspects of it that allowed us to discern coherent stories of
policy problem representations, argumentations, and justifications regarding the
merger. We called these WPR stories.
In line with our overall framing of a critical policy study, the media material served
not only to unfold a public discussion, but also to provide insight into the media’s
bystander and co-constructive role in the problem representations surrounding the
policy change. The media was thus seen as intervening in the political life that
contributes to the formation of plural solidarities or ‘‘publics’’ (cf. Cottle, 2006). The
public’s role in systemic change such as the merger of the three monopoly operators
can be viewed as parallel to and entangled with the discursive strategies of other
democratic institutions, such as the executive and representative power involved
in the problem constructs of the policy documents. In questions that are raised
and suggested by the government and decided through parliamentarian processes,
one role of the media becomes to inform citizens about the political processes and
to serve by providing contextualizing, critical, and supportive explanations of the
developments in the government sphere.
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Results
Four Storylines Pushing Towards a Resolution
After structuring and analysing the material, four main WPR storylines materialized.
The stories, which partly overlap in their argumentation, involve problem constructs
that are portrayed as being solved through the state gambling monopoly fusion. The
first story concerns the threat of an imploding gambling policy system due to its non-
compliance with the EU framework. The second story draws on a general zeitgeist
regarding great and rapid global technological transformations and the need for Finland
to stay informed and competitive. The motif of the third story is closely related to the
second one and concerns the need to protect the national gambling policy system
against outside forces in terms of online operators. The fourth story can be viewed as a
meta-narrative that comments on how the process was able to gather political consensus
for systemic change. This storyline goes beyond the representation of the three-
operator monopoly system as a problem: It also underlines the key WPR idea that the
new policy constituted the construct of the old monopoly system as a problem.
Implosion storyline: Internal competition. Politicians, particularly the represen-
tatives of the Minister of the Interior, used the concept of political will to push the
developments in the direction of the monopoly merger. ‘‘The political will is to
sustain the monopoly system. For this we have the support from the European
Commission,’’ stated Päivi Räsänen in HS in December 2014 (M. Nieminen, 2014).
The EU had many roles in the reasoning around the situation: as a threat to the
current system (with EU law running the errands of the free market competition),
as a guarantee for a good system (sustaining a monopoly), and as a frame of
reference to adapt to in line with both the monopoly exemption from the free market
and its expectations (which do not allow internal competitors to compete while leaving
other EU operators outside their market). The message from policy makers was that
the new system would be safe and that the Finnish people could put their trust in it
to continue to involve all components of importance (Junkkari & Nieminen 2014;
M. Nieminen, 2014; Raeste, 2015a).
During the preparation of the gambling policy change, the Finnish government
represented the three-monopoly system as problematic in the policy documents
in view of EU law, with reference to the risk of internal competition developing
between the three existing Finnish gambling monopoly operators. To avoid internal
competition, each monopoly operated a distinct set of games (in principle: lotteries
and sports betting, slots and casino games, and betting on horse races). However, the
products could, especially in their online variants, begin to resemble each other to
the degree that an internal competition could start to threaten the monopoly system.
As non-Finnish gambling operators in the EU would not be able to compete with
the Finnish monopoly operators, this could be viewed as discriminatory against
operators from other member states and thus entail a future breach of EU law.
Another risk for a possible situation of internal competition put forward by the
government was an increase in the marketing of gambling products, which would
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be at odds with the official main aim of Finnish gambling policy: the reduction of
social and health problems related to gambling (Ministry of the Interior, 2015).
A one-operator monopoly was argued to remove the risk of such internal competition
(Ministry of the Interior, 2015).
Media reports also represented the three-operator system as carrying inherent risks
of being in breach of EU law. Prime Minister Stubb mentioned the risk that internal
competition within the three-operator system could conflict with EU law (Junkkari &
Nieminen, 2014). Chief Secretary Päivi Nerg feared that the gambling products
of the three operators would start to overlap and that then there would be a risk
that someone would complain about this situation to the EU, and the European
Commission would get involved again (Palojärvi, 2015). Nerg was referring here to
the infringement proceedings that the European Commission commenced against
Finland and several other member states in 2006. The European Commission
suspected that the regulation of online gambling in the member states in question
was in conflict with EU law. The infringement proceedings against Finland were
brought to an end in November 2013 when the European Commission declared that,
after amendments were made to the Lotteries Act, the Finnish legislation was no
longer in conflict with EU law.
The monopoly merger was considered to be justified in terms of competition; Nerg
felt it should go ahead in order to better compete with operators from abroad and to
prevent internal competition between existing operators (Palojärvi, 2015). With a
one-operator monopoly system, the internal competition dilemma would be solved,
explained the Minister of the Interior, Minister Räsänen, in a news piece in HS in
March 2015 (Raeste, 2015a).
In this storyline, the judicial and economic justifications of the merger were emphasized.
The merger was represented as a preemptive measure to guarantee the future of the
gambling monopoly system. This mode of representation was readily accepted in the
media and left largely unproblematized, especially in the early stages of reporting.
The storyline was also closely related to another storyline in which the merger was
represented as a necessity determined by the zeitgeist.
Zeitgeist: We need to be up to date! In the policy documents, the one-operator
monopoly system was represented as one that would be more soundly protected from
any future charges of violation of the free market principles of the EU:
In this alternative, the future development of the rising trend of overlaps between
the game products, generated by the changes in the operational environment
[emphasis added], and the likely, and from the EU law perspective problematic,
competition between the operators will be removed. (Ministry of the Interior,
2015, p. 41)
The alternatives to the merger of the three operators were (a) the merger of only
Veikkaus and RAY and (b) the maintenance of the old system (Ministry of the
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Interior, 2015). In the previous quotation, the problem of possible unacceptable
competition between the three monopolies was considered to be related to ‘‘changes
in the operational environment.’’ The fear of unwanted competition between the
existing Finnish operators was no longer represented as merely a legal matter. It was
suggested that, because of technological development and changes in customer
preference, the product ranges of the three operators would start to overlap. In short,
the idea that each monopoly could operate a set of gambling products that was
clearly distinct from the other two sets of products was becoming an obstacle to
developing attractive new gambling products: ‘‘It is possible to modernize the
gambling supply within the monopoly system, but the three-operator system curtails
this possibility’’ (Finnish Government, 2016, p. 26).
In the media texts from 2014 to 2015, when the problem was first introduced,
government representatives were justifying the need for change in the system by
referring to the rapid development of the gambling business as a result of digitalization.
Prime Minister Alexander Stubb stated that because of digitalization and online
gambling, the whole gambling industry was being reorganized globally (Junkkari &
Nieminen, 2014). He pointed out the need to answer to new demands, as the
character of gambling had changed to the extent that the changes threatened the old
gambling system. The discussions involved connotations of great transformations for
which Finland must be on the alert. Minister of the Interior Päivi Räsänen explained
that ‘‘we need to be up to date with what’s going on’’ and related it to the same
technology-change zeitgeist (M. Nieminen, 2014). Preparation for the system change
was accounted for as a reaction to the rapid and pronounced transformations in
gambling environments, in particular the increase in online gambling.
The new technological developments in the gambling sector formed a storyline through
which the Finnish government represented the existing three-operator gambling
monopoly system as problematic. What materialized was a problem construct of
market pressure that demanded active policymaking. Finland and the Finnish gambling
operators were represented to be in a situation in which urgent reaction to the demands
of the ‘‘zeitgeist’’ was necessary. The great technological, social, and economic forces
of development were represented as forcing the merger of the three operators.
In the constitutionof the three-operator gambling system as problematic, a specific
presupposition underlay the zeitgeist storyline: an erasure of agency. This term
refers to all of the ways in which technological development or more general changes
in operational environments are represented in a deterministic way. The agency and
capacity of the government and the Finnish gambling operators was undermined:
‘‘In the development of gambling products one tries to react to changes in gambling
behaviour and to utilize the technologies commonly employed by consumers’’ (Ministry
of the Interior, 2015, p. 22).
Within this storyline, the Finnish government, operators, and other stakeholders
materialized as passive bystanders in the currents of this determination. The passivity
or erasure of active agency in terms of possibilities to manage market development
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functioned as a way to justify and emphasize the necessity of revising gambling
policy. Interestingly, in the policy documents, Finnish actors were considered to be
endowed with active agency only when the beneficial effects of the new policy were
discussed: ‘‘In a one-operator gambling monopoly model there is . . . a need to still
define the forms of gambling that can be legally operated. In this way, it is possible to
direct the development of gambling products in advance to an acceptable direction
[emphasis added]’’ (Finnish Government, 2016, p. 28).
The Finnish government was represented in the quotation as capable of actively
directing the development of gambling products in Finland in the case of a one-
operator system. This enabling of agency stands in stark contrast to the erasure of
agency mode of representation that permeated most of the discourse on technological
development in the material. The Administration Committee of the Parliament
(2016) argued in its report that ‘‘by developing new legislation it will be possible to
influence the prevention of an unlawful foreign supply of gambling as the range of
gambling products diversifies’’ (p. 8). In both texts, active agency—in terms of an
independent, strong, capable, and able state—emerged as a way to remedy the effects
of technological development about which the Finnish institutional actors were
represented as having had no part. The presupposition of erasure of agency can thus
be seen as a discursive technique that underlined that the need for the merger did not
stem from national economic interests (problematic from the EU law perspective),
but was determined by forces not under Finland’s control.
Protection: Channelling the desire to gamble. In the third storyline, the merger
was represented as a matter of protecting the gambling monopoly system against
the foreign gambling operators: ‘‘If the Finnish gambling supply cannot keep up
with international developments, the capability to channel [demand] to the domestic
monitored gambling supply will weaken’’ (Finnish Government, 2016, p. 26). In this
quotation, the three-monopoly system is represented as problematic because of the
possible future inability of the Finnish gambling system to ‘‘channel’’ the gambling
demand to legal gambling alternatives that are operated by the existing three monopolies.
The problem would thus be that the operators outside the Finnish jurisdiction, with
their new innovative gambling products, would attract a growing share of Finnish
gambling. As a result of this development, should it happen, the foundations of the
Finnish gambling system would be eroded.
Variation of the same storyline was also found in the media material. The media texts
refer to the government’s conviction that a one state-owned monopoly could provide
gamblers with safer and more controllable game types (Raeste, 2015b). According to
the newspaper Karjalainen, there was an expectation that the new monopoly could
develop more efficient control tools for helping problem gamblers to manage their
gambling (‘‘Uusi Veikkaus on aloittanut toiintansa,’’ 2017). Thus, it would make
sense to encourage the Finns to play the games of the national monopoly.
The idea of channelling was supported by the problematic presupposition of
naturalization of the desire to gamble. In the naturalization of the desire to gamble,
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the term channelling, as in orienting or steering in a certain way, constituted a key
concept. But what, then, was being channelled? The answer was ‘‘desire,’’ as shown
in the following quotation, in which the views of the European Commission are
discussed: ‘‘The Commission saw that Finland had the regulations necessary for
guaranteeing that a policy of monitored growth, which attempts to channel the desire
to gamble [emphasis added] into monitored operations, is applied to the gambling
monopoly’’ (Finnish Government, 2016, p. 19).
In the same document, the desire to gamble was also mentioned when the foundations
of the Finnish gambling policy were discussed: ‘‘income acquisition by exploiting
[emphasis added] people’s desire to gamble is only allowed in a limited scale and
only for the purposes of charity or to support other ideological activities’’ (Finnish
Government, 2016, p. 6). It is important to notice here that desire, in the sense given
to it in the context of this document, referred to striving for fulfilment of innate needs
that are not deliberately willed. Desire thus enacted meanings that associated it outside
the social or political sphere. This was also highlighted by discursively representing
desire to gamble as something that can be exploited, that is, something beyond the
conscious rational calculus (see O’Malley & Valverde, 2004).
The previous two quotations are the only mentions of the desire to gamble in the analysed
documents. More often it was the notion of ‘‘consumer demand’’ that was being
channelled. The government needed to channel consumer demand or the desire to
gamble. Channelling, understood as a practice of government, presupposed a population
with the desire to gamble that needed to be satisfied through gambling provision.
Channelling also presupposed that desire is a permanent feature of the population:
Channelling would not make sense if prohibiting all gambling did away with the desire.
Thus, in the logic of channelling gambling, desire to gamble was represented as a
permanent feature of the population. This presupposition was, we argue, a politically
construed ‘‘naturalization of the desire to gamble.’’ In the constitutionor problematization
of the three-operator gambling system as a policy problem, this presupposition had
a specific function. In the policy problem representation, the channelling capacity
of the three-operator system was in danger because Finnish legislation precluded
the possibility of Finnish operators to develop novel products that would channel the
desire to gamble to the products of the monopoly operators. Insofar as the desire
to gamble was represented as a constant, the possibility of creating new gambling
demand through marketing and product development was excluded a priori from the
logic of channelling. Moreover, the negative consequences of gambling were similarly
presupposed to be natural and inevitable (see Livingstone et al., 2018). If the desire
to gamble was presumed to be a variable instead of a constant, marketing and
product development would create new demand and more gambling-related harms.
The political value of the naturalization of the desire to gamble seemed to be precisely
related to this: It undermined any calls for gambling policies that decreased demand.
Reaching a political consensus. The fourth storyline that emerged from the media
material showed how the old three-operator system was construed as a problem.
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At the very first stage of the merger discussion, the voices represented in the media
material were not all in favour of the change of the old three-operator monopoly
system. Critical remarks were especially raised by the civil society beneficiaries of
gambling revenues (M. Nieminen & Niskakangas, 2014; M. Nieminen & Pusa,
2014). A discussion that was lacking from the policy documents, but that was highly
visible in media reporting, was the importance of gambling revenues for the public
good. Finland has a unique system in which a large part of the support for civil
society organizations stems from earmarked gambling revenues. This circumstance
has oriented the general public discourse towards presenting gambling as a national
good deed—a view that underpins a strong general legitimacy of the gambling system
(Järvinen-Tassopoulos, 2012; Matilainen, 2017). According to media quotes of
Minister of the Interior Petteri Orpo, there was no political desire to abandon state
gambling revenues. He emphasized that if the gambling monopoly were to vanish,
it could result in a situation in which the revenues of the beneficiaries would be taken
from the state budget (Valtanen, 2016).
The parent organization of the beneficiaries in the social and health fields, Suomen
sosiaali ja terveys ry (SOSTE) argued against the merger in the initial phase of
reporting (Jungman, Rosenberg-Ryhänen, & Kiukas, 2014). All operators had their
own games and the only savings they could arrange after merging would be to reduce
game supply ‘‘Then there would not be any benefits for the citizens, but rather the
contrary,’’ the representatives of SOSTE commented (Jungman et al., 2014). This
aspect is interesting because the SOSTE organizations—which all operate in the
name of citizens’ health and social well-being—expressed the idea that a lesser
gambling supply was a worse scenario from the citizens’ perspectives. This view can
be seen as going against the public health approach of total consumption correlating
with both availability and level of harm (Hansen & Rossow, 2012; Markham,
Young, & Doran, 2014). It is as if the SOSTE organizations, in this particular
statement, had forgotten about gambling having consequences and were only thinking
of citizens as people wanting many game alternatives and gambling revenues for
beneficiaries. This rationale was also entangled with the presupposition of the
constant desire to gamble.
Other beneficiaries also expressed insecurity regarding the support to civil society
in the case of the merger taking place. They were worried that other sectors would
become beneficiaries of ‘‘their’’ money. For example, the beneficiaries of the revenues
of the lottery provider Veikkaus demanded that they be heard and have access to the
political process underpinning the merger (M. Nieminen & Niskakangas, 2014).
In comparison to the other gambling operators, the owner of Fintoto, Suomen Hippos,
had a lot space in the media, especially during the beginning of the fusion discussion.
Suomen Hippos did not want the fusion with RAY and Veikkaus (Arola, 2014).
According to the representatives of Suomen Hippos, it was possible to make changes
within the current system and making the decision in haste could cause severe
damage. Suomen Hippos was worried about a reduction in money and the continuity
of its activities (Hakola, 2015).
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During the winter of late 2014 and the beginning of 2015, the merger process was not
very visible in media reporting. In view of the reintroduction of the question in the
media in the spring of 2015, it seems that a mainstreaming of views on the merger
had been conducted during the winter. In March 2015, HS reported that all political
parties unanimously stood behind the idea of merging the operators (Berg, 2015).
The representatives of the Ministry of the Interior, Räsänen and Nerg, said that the
merger was recommended because it had been prepared carefully by the workgroup
and the merger had wide political support among all stakeholders and political
parties (Berg, 2015; Raeste, 2015b).
Some of the stakeholders and actors had thus changed their mind during the period
under study. For instance, in September 2015, the Secretary General of SOSTE
commented: ‘‘We believe that one monopoly is more capable of responding to the
[foreign] competition and in that way protecting the funding of public health care,
sports, research, youth work and horse breeding’’ (Savolainen, 2015). Suomen Hippos
decided that Fintoto would be part of the fusion (Pusa, 2016).
In conclusion, many actors that initially raised critical voices turned out to be
supportive of the merger. Clearly, the three-operator system was not a policy problem
for several key stakeholders at the beginning of the process; it had to be construed as
such. The policy problem needed to be represented in a way that could be accepted
by the key stakeholders who were most of all interested in the revenues. Once this
was achieved, there were no obstacles to reaching a political consensus. To put it
differently in the terminology of the WPR approach, the three-operator system became
a problem that started to exist more and more ‘‘in the real’’ (cf. Bacchi, 2016, p. 33).
In the media texts, the idea of a political consensus was driven through and represented
by the rather opaque concept of political will, signifying shared views between political
parties and stakeholders. This element drove the storylines towards their supposed
solution, which was the monopoly merger. This reflected the fact that not only did
the Finnish political climate represent the Nordic consensus-driven model (cf.
Lijphart, 2012; Post, Raile, & Raile, 2010), but that patterns of interrelationships
between political and media systems also followed a Northern European or democratic
corporatist model (Hallin & Mancini, 2004; H. Nieminen, 2010) in which power
sharing and political consensus systems are typical features. From the context of
the material in this analysis, the concept of a political will can be characterized
as ‘‘a sufficient set of decision makers with a common understanding of a particular
problem on the formal agenda which is committed to supporting a commonly
perceived, potentially effective policy solution’’ (Post et al., 2010, p. 671). This notion
served as an efficient enabler for the progress of the merger process.
The questioning of the fusion process and a discussion about other options for
changing the gambling system appeared in the media material only after the political
decision making had proceeded to a point of no return in the autumn of 2015. The
main criticism concerned the fact that decision makers had emphasized the safe-
guarding of funding for beneficiaries and safeguarding the state monopoly system,
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instead of discussing issues related to the prevention of gambling-related problems
(Myllymaa, 2016; Pajula & Heiskanen, 2016; Toivonen, 2017).
For instance, in an editorial in HS in April 2016, researcher Antti Myllymaa of
the University of Helsinki pointed out that the largest challenges were yet to come
(Myllymaa, 2016). In an interview in the same daily, Myllymaa pointed out the
hypocrisy involved in the harm argument only coming into the picture after the merger
was a fact: ‘‘When the monopoly is justified in Finland, the question of distributing
the money to public good is emphasized. Yet, if the Finnish gambling monopoly is
justified to the EU . . . the prevention of gambling-related problems is mentioned’’
(Toivonen, 2017). Myllymaa also brought up the license system as a valid alternative
to the monopoly system.
Mari Pajula, the development manager of the national gambling helpline, Peluuri,
and PhD student Maria Heiskanen commented on the public discussion of the fusion
process, especially the circumstance of it having emphasized securing gambling
returns and improving the availability of games: ‘‘The returns yielded by the Finnish
gambling system benefit many, and the beneficiaries are standing up for their
economic interests. We need more courage and will to discuss the practical aims of
prevention and reduction of harms’’ (Pajula & Heiskanen, 2016).
In Table 1, we have summarized the WPR storylines that led to the state monopoly
merger: the main problem construct, the conditions and threats that they imply, and
the solution (merger of the three operators).
Discussion
The policy documents and the media material unfold four stories of the policy
problem representations and the presuppositions underpinning the great monopoly
merger. In these stories, the three-operator system was construed as an urgent problem
needing to be solved. The problem representations served important political functions:
the protection of the monopoly system and the protection of the gambling revenues.
The policy documents provided a perspective from within the constructs that drove
the progress from the centre of the system. The necessity for change was construed as
if it were determined by forces outside the control of the Finnish gambling operators
or the state. The political function of this problem representation was to underline
that the need for change was not influenced by national financial interests. What is
lacking from the documents is a problematization of the basic presuppositions
regarding the naturalness of the desire to gamble. The representation of desire to
gamble as an inherent feature of human populations—which is common in the
gambling legislations of many European countries (Swiss Institute of Comparative
Law, 2006)—is particularly problematic because it is at odds with the aim of
preventing and reducing gambling-related harms. Insofar as the desire to gamble is
an invariable, gambling-related harms are seen as inevitable (Livingstone et al.,
2018). The opportunity for a system change towards more centralized control of the
market could have involved public health ambitions to increase prevention efforts
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or to restrict gambling supply (cf. Tammi, Castrén, & Lintonen, 2015). Instead, the
worry of losing gambling revenues to foreign operators motivated the merger of the
monopoly operators.
In comparison, the media construed the problems a bit differently. Their perspective
was more from the outside and a larger repertoire of voices was heard on the matter.
The material was larger and spanned a longer time frame. To begin with, some
stakeholders—especially those representing beneficiaries in the civil society sector—
raised worries about the merger and expressed criticisms of it, but they were in the
end presented as mainstreamed and synchronized in favour of the merger. It was as
if the problem representation in the policy documents spread and convinced all
interested parties that everyone would gain from the systemic change. Finally, after
the merger was fact, critique of the policy problem representation—including the EU
framing and the argument of preventing outside competition—was presented
together with the process in itself.
The presuppositions and assumptions made functioned to guarantee that the monopoly
system would serve the nation and its interests, as well as handle all threats and
challenges, while sticking to the regulatory framework of the EU. This was a unique
development and a unique policy process in Europe. The gambling policy of Norway,
the only other European country to safeguard its gambling monopoly system, only
highlights the exceptionality of the Finnish case. In Norway, public health concerns
have had a real impact on gambling policy and significant restrictions on gambling
supply have been introduced (Rossow & Hansen, 2016). Jensen (2017) offers a
convincing explanation for this: In Norway, the state gets no tax income from
gambling and has thus had less interest in gambling revenues than in Finland.
Considering the high level of gambling consumption in Finland and the great
dependency of civil society organizations and research on gambling revenues, the
justifications for a further centralized monopoly model needs to be critically
scrutinized. This study has been a first attempt in this direction.
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